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The current paper offers a new explanation on the emergence of threshold effects and 
multiple equilibria, for which the high (low) income equilibrium is associated with high 
(low) environmental quality. This new explanation rests on endogenous technological 
choice in the presence of environmental taxation – an idea whose foundations find 
strong  support  from  existing  empirical  evidence.  Thus,  the  interactions  between 
environmental policy and technology choice, within a framework that accounts for the 
health effects of pollution, can explain some of the observed differences in income, life 
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1   Introduction 
As the interest on the underlying characteristics and driving forces of economic growth rose 
considerably during the last two decades, it was inevitable that many researchers would turn 
their  attention  to  the  implications  of  sustained  growth  for  the  quality  of  the  natural 
environment (e.g., Mourmouras, 1991; Gradus and Smulders, 1993; John and Pecchenino, 
1994; Bovenberg and Smulders, 1996; Stokey, 1998; Agnani et al., 2005; Jouvet et al., 2005). 
The fact that various by products of economic activity (e.g., gases, chemicals, toxins, smoke, 
radioactive substances, litter etc.) contaminate and erode the natural environment can hardly 
be disputed. Yet, contrary to what this fact may suggest, there is evidence showing that 
relatively high pollution is not always a feature associated with economies that produce more 
output. On the contrary, there are examples where developed countries perform better, in 
terms of environmental quality, when compared to some of their poorer counterparts.
1  
     Understanding  and  explaining  why  richer  economies  may  be  more  polluted  is 
straightforward.  The  same  is  not  true,  however,  for  instances  where  the  more  polluted 
economies are relatively poorer. Perhaps this is the reason why different arguments have 
emerged in order to explain why per capita GDP is not always positively associated with 
environmental  degradation.  For  many  years,  the  dominant  explanation  has  been  the 
environmental Kuznets curve (e.g., Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Andreoni and Levinson, 
2001;  Millimet  et  al.,  2003;  Aldy,  2005).  According  to  this  explanation,  the  relationship 
between  some  pollutants  and  per  capita  GDP  is  inverse U shaped,  meaning  that,  once 
economies reach and exceed an income threshold, pollution declines as per capita GDP 
continues  to  grow.  In  a  more  recent  contribution,  Mariani  et  al.  (2010)  propose  an 
explanation  which  relates  to  the  idea  of  threshold  effects  and  multiple,  path dependent 
equilibria. Using an overlapping generations model where life expectancy is endogenously 
determined by environmental quality, they find that multiple equilibria may emerge – in 
particular, the equilibrium with the higher stock of human capital is also associated with 
                                                 
1 For example, while the United States (≈ 19 metric tons) and Canada (≈ 16.7 metric tons) have higher CO2 
emissions  per  capita  than  countries  with  lower  per  capita  GDP  such  as  Estonia  (≈ 13.1  metric  tons), 
Kazakhstan (≈ 12.6 metric tons), Oman (≈ 16.3 metric tons), the Czech Republic (≈ 11.3 metric tons) and 
Turkmenistan (≈ 9 metric tons), the majority of countries in the latter group appear to have higher CO2 
emissions per capita compared to richer nations such as France (≈ 6.2 metric tons), Sweden (≈ 5.6 metric 
tons), Switzerland (≈ 5.6 metric tons) and Germany (≈ 9.7 metric tons). The data, compiled by the United 
Nation’s Department of Economic and Social Affairs, refers to the year 2006 and can be accessed electronically 
at http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=751&crid.   3 
better environmental conditions. This occurs because there are positive feedbacks in the 
determination of environmental and human capital dynamics: not only does environmental 
quality supports human capital accumulation and output growth, but, crucially, the quality of 
the environment improves monotonically as the level of income grows. 
     In this paper, my aim is to provide an alternative explanation on the possible emergence 
of multiple, path depended equilibria for which higher (lower) income is associated with 
better (worse) environmental quality and higher (lower) life expectancy. In contrast to the 
existing literature, the mechanism that I propose does not rely on an outcome whereby 
environmental quality improves monotonically with economic growth. Instead, I derive this 
result under a more plausible scenario in which, for a given emission to output ratio, output 
growth  degrades  the  environment.  What  is  crucial  in  my  framework  is  that  the  growth 
process  can  complement  environmental  policy  in  inducing  entrepreneurs  to  implement 
cleaner  production  methods.  Hence,  the  use  of  environmentally  friendlier  technologies 
(induced  by  environmental  taxation)  is  what  leads  to  reduced  pollution  and  higher  life 
expectancy in relatively richer economies.
2     
     The underlying motivation behind my analysis is as follows. Threshold effects in the joint 
determination of national income and environmental degradation require that the effects 
governing the environment growth nexus are two way causal. There is ample evidence to 
suggest that pollution may have a profoundly adverse impact to the overall health profile of 
the population and, therefore, their longevity prospects (e.g., Pimentel et al., 1998; Donohoe, 
2003; Lacasaña et al., 2005). Thus, an idea similar to that of Mariani et al. (2010) – that is, the 
assumption  according  to  which  the  stock  of  pollution  has  an  adverse  effect  on  life 
expectancy – is certainly an essential element of the interactions between economic growth 
and  environmental  quality.  Nevertheless,  the  other  side  of  the  environment growth 
relationship,  i.e.,  the  overall  impact  of  income  on  environmental  quality,  needs  to  be 
reflected upon. In Mariani et al. (2010), the environmental impacts of polluting consumption 
and  environmental  maintenance  spending  are  additively  separable.  Individuals  who 
internalise  the  impact  of  their  own  actions  on  the  environment,  offer  such  a  level  of 
                                                 
2 Another analysis that derives multiple equilibria  in a model  with  pollution externalities  and endogenous 
mortality is that of Varvarigos (2010). However, he does not take account of the entrepreneurial choice of the 
technology that determines the emission to output ratio, as I do in this paper. Furthermore, in his model the 
high  income  equilibrium  is  actually  associated  with  the  relatively  higher  (rather  than  the  lower)  flow  of 
pollution. Thus, the implications are much different from what I seek to explain in this paper.       4 
environmental maintenance that, collectively, it dominates the adverse environmental impact 
of  (polluting)  consumption.  Since  both  types  of  expenditures  (consumption  and 
maintenance) are proportional to income, additive separability implies that the overall effect 
of  higher  income  on  the  quality  of  the  environment  is  always  positive,  even  for  given 
emission rates.  
     However, the empirical plausibility of an outcome whereby the benefit from activities 
targeted at environmental support is greater than the overall environmental cost of pollution, 
a cost that such activities are supposed to mitigate in the first place, is perhaps questionable. 
Actually, some existing analyses which employ a similar type of additive separability, identify 
this outcome as a shortcoming. They address it by imposing a non negativity constraint that 
requires  the  environmental  cost  of  emissions  to  dominate  the  benefit  from  abatement. 
Roussillon and Schweinzer (2010) justify this restriction on the basis that “requiring non 
negative  differences  in  the  damage  function…ensures  that  reductive  efforts  cannot 
substitute  productive  efforts”  (Roussillon  and  Schweinzer,  2010;  Footnote  5,  p.  4). 
Economides and Philippopoulos (2008) use a similar restriction, arguing that the scenario for 
which environmental maintenance is stronger than the polluting effect of production is “too 
good to be true” (Economides and Philippopoulos, 2008; p.213). Evidently, these analyses 
avoid situations whereby, for given technological parameters, income growth represents a 
net benefit for the environment – after all, environmental degradation is largely a result of 
human activities.
3 
     So what does the more realistic setting whereby environmental quality is a decreasing 
function of aggregate production imply for long run outcomes? In the first part of my main 
analysis I show that, under any possible parameter configuration, the dynamics of pollution 
and capital accumulation converge to a unique stationary equilibrium. This is because the 
dynamics of capital accumulation and environmental quality do not complement each other: 
on  the  one  hand,  reduced  pollution  supports  longevity  and  saving  behaviour,  thus 
promoting capital formation; on the other hand, however, capital accumulation adds to the 
stock of pollution, thus deteriorating the quality of the environment. 
                                                 
3 In a recent paper, Palivos and Varvarigos (2010) use a similar criticism in order to justify the use of non 
separable environmental impacts for pollution and abatement activities. Accounting for the beneficial effects of 
environmental quality on life expectancy, they show that pollution abatement can provide an additional engine 
of long run growth; at the same time, abatement eliminates the occurrence of periodic equilibria (endogenous 
fluctuations).    5 
     Subsequently, I modify the basic set up so as to introduce two different technologies that 
are distinguished by their emission rate. Effectively, I endogenise the process through which 
entrepreneurs  choose  whether  to  employ either the  more  polluting  or the  less  polluting 
technology  in  the  production  of  their  goods.  Although  the  latter  is  more  costly  to 
implement, the presence of an environmental tax leads to an outcome whereby, as long as 
the economy’s capital stock exceeds an endogenously derived threshold, entrepreneurs find 
optimal to use the cleaner technology. This outcome is the source of positive feedbacks that, 
under some parameter configurations, may lead to multiple, path dependent equilibria for 
which a high (low) capital stock is associated with a low (high) stock of pollution. Despite 
the  fact  that,  for  a  given  emission  rate,  higher  income  is  detrimental  to  environmental 
quality, it is the higher level of income that could induce entrepreneurs to employ cleaner 
technologies. The use of such technologies reduces the damaging environmental effect of 
production and, thus, promotes longevity. The latter induces a higher saving rate which, 
consequently, supports capital accumulation – hence, it guarantees that income levels are 
high enough to support the use of environmentally friendly technologies.
4 
   This is a significantly different explanation on the emergence of multiple equilibria – more 
importantly,  an  explanation  whose  foundations  find  unequivocal  support  from  existing 
empirical evidence. For example, OECD (2007) reports results from a study which shows 
that environmentally related taxes encourage changes in production processes that are based 
on cleaner production techniques and environmental R&D. Existing studies also support the 
idea that higher GDP is positively associated with the promotion of new technologies that 
are  directed  towards  environmental  improvements  (e.g.,  Komen  et  al.,  1997).  Further 
discussion and support for these ideas is provided by Requate and Unold (2003) and Requate 
(2005) among others.             
     The remaining paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I present a baseline set up 
with the fundamental characteristics of the economy. The steady state equilibrium and its 
                                                 
4 Gutiérrez (2008) and Jouvet et al. (2010) also derive very interesting policy implications from OLG models in 
which pollution affects the health costs incurred by agents. Gutiérrez (2008) offers an appropriate design of 
income taxation that will eradicate the dynamic inefficiency that results from the significant health costs that 
pollution entails for the old generation. Jouvet et al. (2010) offer a very interesting, additional dimension in the 
analysis of the health effects from environmental degradation. In addition to the negative health externality of 
pollution, they also consider a positive externality emerging from the fact that lower life expectancy means that 
fewer  people  occupy  the  (fixed)  available  amount  of  land.  They  show  that  the  taxation  of  private  health 
expenditures internalises the congestion effect from higher longevity, thus it is an important policy element in 
the effort to achieve the social optimum.        6 
analysis are presented in Section 3. Section 4 introduces the idea of environmental taxation 
and endogenous technology choice and shows how multiple equilibria can be attributed to 
the joint dynamics and two way causal effects between pollution and capital accumulation. 
In Section 5, I conclude.  
                  
2   The Economy 
Time takes the form of discrete periods which are indexed by  0,1,2,... t = . In each period, 
there  are  two  groups  of  agents  inhabiting  the  economy  –  ‘workers/savers’  and 
‘entrepreneurs’. At the beginning of a period, a mass of each group comes into existence. 
The sizes for both groups of agents are normalised to unity.  
 
2.1   Entrepreneurs and Final Goods Production  
Entrepreneurs live for only one period.
5 Each one is endowed with a technology that allows 
her to combine labour from workers,  it L , and capital from financial intermediaries,  it K , so 
as to produce a specific variety i  of an intermediate product according to  
 
1 β β
it it it y BK L
- = ,  (1) 
where  0 B >  and 0 1 β < < . Denote the wage per unit of labour by  t w  and the rental price of 
capital by  t R . Furthermore, let us denote the price of an intermediate good by  it ρ . Cost 
minimisation implies  
  (1 )
β β
t t it it w m β BK L
- = - ,  (2) 
and  
 
1 1 β β
t t it it R m βBK L
- - = ,  (3) 
where  t m  is the marginal cost of production – associated with the Lagrange multiplier of the 
cost minimisation problem. Using (2) and (3), we can write the entrepreneur’s profits as  
  ( ) it it t it ̟ ρ m y = - .  (4) 
                                                 
5 The assumption that different types of agents may face different lifespan (as it is the case with entrepreneurs 
and workers in this framework) is by no means a new one. See, for example, Chakraborty and Lahiri (2007).    7 
     The  entrepreneur  sells  her  product  to  firms  who  produce  the  economy’s  final 
consumption  good.  They  do  so  by  combining  all  the  available  varieties  of  intermediate 







t it Y y di
- -  
=  
  ∫ ,  (5) 
where  1 σ >   is  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between  different  varieties  of  intermediate 
inputs.    
     Let us assume that the final good is the numéraire and that firms producing it operate 
under perfect competition. Profit maximisation leads to the standard demand function  
 
σ
it it t y ρ Y
- = ,  (6) 
while the aggregate price index is given by  





t it ρ ρ di
- - = ∫ .  (7) 
     Substituting (6) in (5), it is straightforward to establish that equation (7) leads to  1 t ρ = . 
Next, we want to find the price that maximises the entrepreneur’s profits. Substituting (6) in 
(4) yields  ( )
σ
it it t it t ̟ ρ m ρ Y









,  (8) 
i.e., the price is set as a mark up over the marginal cost of production. Equation (8) also 
reveals a well known outcome associated with monopolistic competition, i.e., the symmetric 
equilibrium. That is,  it t ρ ρ i = " . Therefore,  it t K K = ,  it t L L =  and  it t y y =  for every i .  








= .  (9) 
     We can utilise the result in (9) so as to derive the equilibrium payments of labour and 







w β BK L
σ
- -
= - ,  (10) 
and  
 






= ,  (11)   8 
respectively.  
     Finally, notice that, by virtue of (5) and (1), the symmetric equilibrium implies that  
 
1 β β
t t t t Y y BK L
- = = ,  (12) 
while an entrepreneur’s equilibrium profits are given by  
 
1
t t ̟ y
σ
= .  (13) 
     Recall that entrepreneurs live for only one period. Therefore, they do not save any of 
their income; instead, they consume their profits, given in (13), at the end of the period 
during which they are alive.
6 
 
2.2   Workers/Savers  
In every period there are two cohorts of workers/savers inhabiting the economy – the young 
and the old. Each young worker is endowed with one unit of labour which she supplies 
inelastically to entrepreneurs in exchange for the market wage  t w . She then decides how 
much to consume and how much to save for retirement, given that, when old, she does not 
have any labour endowment and, therefore, any alternative source of income from which she 
could finance her future consumption needs. 
     One  deviation  of  this  model  from  the  standard  overlapping  generations  setting 
(Diamond,  1965)  is  the  idea  that  survival  to  maturity  is  not  certain.  Instead,  I  follow 
Chakraborty (2004) by assuming that survival is determined by the realisation of a mortality 
shock. Specifically, I assume that a young worker will survive to maturity with probability 
(0,1) t ψ Î   whereas  with  probability  1 t ψ -   she  dies  prematurely  and  cannot  enjoy  any 
activities when old. Provided that only agents who survive are able enjoy utility in both 
periods, their lifetime utility is given by
7  
  1 ln ln
t t t
t t t U c ψ c + = + .  (14) 
                                                 
6 The assumption of monopolistic competition is a useful device that allows strictly positive entrepreneurial 
profits. The importance will become apparent in Section 4 where the possible choice of a cleaner technology by 
entrepreneurs is a costly one.  
7 In the utility function, a superscript indicates the period where the agent is born while the subscript indicates 
the period in which the actual activity takes place.  
   9 
     Each  agent  maximises  her  lifetime  utility  subject  to  the  constraints  for  consumption 
during youth and old age. Denoting saving by  t s , the gross rate of interest on deposits by 
1 t r + , and given that  1 it t ρ ρ = = , these constraints are given by 
t
t t t c w s = -  and  1 1
t
t t t c r s + + =  
respectively.  
 
2.3   Financial Intermediaries  
Financial  intermediaries  undertake  the  task  of  channelling  capital  from  households  to 
entrepreneurs. Specifically, they accept deposits by young workers and, in return, they offer 
the gross rate of return  1 t r +  per unit of deposited income. They transform these saving 
deposits into capital by accessing a technology that transforms one unit of time t  output 
into  0 q >  units of time  1 t +  capital which they supply to intermediate good suppliers at a 
rental cost of  1 t R +  per unit.
8  
     Following others (e.g., Chakraborty, 2004; Tang and Zhang, 2007), I appeal to the idea 
that the young deposit their saving to a mutual fund which promises to provide retirement 
income, provided that the depositor survives to old age. Otherwise, the income of those 
who die is shared equally among surviving members of the mutual fund. In view of this, and 
the assumption that financial intermediaries operate under perfect competition, we have 
  1 1 t t t ψ r qR + + = ,  (15) 
which implies that their costs (i.e., the total return to all surviving savers) must be equal to 
their revenues (i.e., the revenues they receive from entrepreneurs who rent capital).  
      
2.4   Life Expectancy  
I assume that life expectancy, captured by the probability of survival  t ψ , is endogenous.
9 In 
particular, it takes the form of a function  
  Ψ( ) t t ψ x = ,  (16)   
                                                 
8 We may think of  q  as the efficiency of the economy (in general) or of the financial sector (in particular) in 
successfully transforming resources into productive capital.  
9 The expected life span of a worker born in t  is  2 (1 ) 1 t t t ψ ψ ψ + - = + . For this reason, I will be making use of 
such terms as ‘life expectancy’, ‘longevity’ and ‘survival probability’ interchangeably.         10 
where  t x  is a variable that describes the health profile of an agent. Following Chakraborty 
(2004),  the  function  in  (16)  satisfies  Ψ 0 ¢ > ,  Ψ 0 ¢¢< ,  Ψ(0) 0 = ,  Ψ( ) (0,1) λ ¥ = Î , 
Ψ (0) 0 φ ¢ = >  and  Ψ ( ) 0 ¢ ¥ = . It is also straightforward to establish that  Ψ( ) Ψ ( ) t t t x x x ¢ >  











, with 0 1 λ < <  and λ φ = . 
     The idea of endogenous longevity is captured by the variable  t x  for which I assume that 
it  is  related  to  average  income  per  capita,  t Y ,  and  pollution,  denoted  t   ,  according  to 
( , ) t t t x X Y   = . This satisfies  0
t Y X >  and   0
t   X < . I restrict my attention to a specific 








= .  (17) 











,  (18) 
such that  Ψ 0
t Y >  and  Ψ 0
t   < . Given  Ψ( ) Ψ ( ) t t t x x x ¢ >  it also follows that  Ψ 0
t t Y Y <  and 
Ψ 0


















 .  
     There is ample evidence to suggest that as economies develop and the population gets 
more educated, more people are likely to adopt a lifestyle which is conducive to their overall 
health status (e.g., Ross and Wu, 1995; Smith, 1999). The positive effect of  t Y  on longevity, 
an assumption that has been widely used in the existing literature (e.g., Cervelati and Sunde, 
2005; Cipriani and Makris, 2007) is meant to capture this idea. Furthermore, the negative 
effect of pollution on longevity conforms to empirical results (e.g., Pimentel et al., 1998; 
Donohoe,  2003,  Lacasaña  et  al.,  2005)  which  unequivocally  show  that  heavily  polluted 
environments  have  profoundly  adverse  effects  on  the  health  characteristics  of  the 
population.   
   11 
2.5   Pollution  
I  assume  that  environmental  degradation  is  a  by product  of  entrepreneurs’  production 
activities.  I  model  the  dynamics  of  the  pollution  stock  so  as  to  capture  changes  in 
environmental quality over time. Specifically, I denote the stock of pollution by  t    and I 
assume that it evolves according to  
  1 t t t   η  P + = + .  (19) 
     The parameter  (0,1) ηÎ  is the rate of residual pollution. In particular, higher values of η  
point to the nature’s reduced capacity in mitigating the cumulative impact of the current on 
the future pollution stock. The variable  t P  is the flow of pollution which determines the 
degrading impact of economic activity on environmental quality. Hence, it is related to total 
entrepreneurial production – and, by virtue of (12), output – according to  t t P py = , where 
0 p >  is an indicator of how ‘dirty’ the manufacturing process is. That is, it determines how 
many pollutant emissions are released into the environment per unit of intermediate good 
produced.  
     Using  t t P py =  in (19) yields 
  1 t t t   η  py + = + ,  (20) 
an  expression  demonstrates  how economic  activity,  combined with  the  existing  level  of 
pollution, contributes further to the decay of the natural environment. Effectively, it does 
this by adding to the future pollution stock.   
 
 
3   Equilibrium  
Taking  account  of  the  fundamental  relationships  in  the  economy,  we  can  describe  its 
temporary equilibrium with 
 
Definition  1.  The  temporary  equilibrium  of  the  economy  is  a  set  of  quantities 
{ }
1
1 1 , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
t t t
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t c c c s L y Y Y ̟ ψ P   K K
-
+ +  and prices { } 1 1 , , , , t t t t t ρ w R R r + +   such that: 
(i)  Given  t w ,  t ψ ,  1 t r +  and  t   , the quantities 
t
t c ,  1
t
t c +  and  t s  solve the optimisation problem of 
a worker born at time t ;    12 
(ii)  Given  it ρ , final goods firms choose quantities for  it y  so as to maximise profits;   
(iii)  Given  t w  and  t R , all entrepreneurs choose, symmetrically, quantities for  t L  and  t K  as well 
as the price  t ρ  in order to maximise profits; 
(iv)  The labour market clears, i.e.,  1 t L = ; 




t t t t t t Y c ψ c s ̟
-
- = + + + ; 
(vi)  The financial market clears, i.e.,  1 1 t t t ψ r qR + + = ; 
 











.  (21) 
     A person that does not possess any working abilities when old will find optimal to save a 
fraction of her labour income for retirement. The possibility of premature death induces the 
person  to  modify  her  saving  behaviour  in  response  to  variations  in  life  expectancy. 
Specifically, an increase in the probability of survival raises the (expected) marginal utility of 
consumption when old. To restore the equilibrium, the marginal utility of her consumption 
when young must increase as well – something that the agent can achieve by saving more 
and consuming less during the first period of her lifetime.    
     The equilibrium condition  1 t L =  implies that  / t t t t K K L k = =  and 
β
t t t Y y Bk = =   t " . 
Therefore, using (10) and  1 t t k qs + = , equation (21) becomes
10  










,  (22) 
where Θ (1 ) ( 1)/ β B σ σ = - - . Furthermore, we can use  t t t Y Y y = =  together with (18), and 
substitute in (22) to derive the dynamics of capital accumulation according to 
  1
Ψ




















.  (23) 
     Using  1 t L = ,  t t K k =  in (12) and substituting in equation (20) yields  
                                                 
10 Production results in full depreciation of capital.   13 
  1 Μ( , )
β
t t t t t   η  pBk k   + = + º ,  (24) 
which  represents  the  dynamics  of  the  pollution  stock.  Given  the  above,  the  economy’s 
dynamic equilibrium is formally described through     
   
Definition 2. For  0 0 , 0 k   > , the dynamic equilibrium is a sequence of temporary equilibria that satisfy  
(i)  1 Κ( , ) t t t k k   + = ;  
(ii)  1 Μ( , ) t t t   k   + = . 
 
     The economy’s long run equilibrium – that is, its steady state – is the solution to the 
planar system of difference equations for the stock of capital per worker and the stock of 
pollution. Formally, the steady state equilibrium is a pair  ˆ ˆ ( , ) k    that satisfies  ˆ ˆ ˆ Κ( , ) k k   =  
and  ˆ ˆ ˆ Μ( , )   k   = . To obtain it, we use  1 ˆ
t t k k k + = =  and  1 ˆ t t       + = =  in equations (23) and 







. Substituting this solution in (23), and solving for 













-     -
   
    =
    -
+          
,  (25) 













-     -
   
    =
  -   -
+          
.  (26) 
     The  foregoing  analysis  provides  analytical  and  explicit  solutions  for  the  steady state 
values  of  capital  per  worker  and  pollution.  Notice  that,  as  long  as economic  activity  is 
responsible  for  environmental  degradation,  the  model  generates  a  unique  steady state 
equilibrium. Multiple equilibria cannot emerge because the dynamics of pollution and capital 
accumulation do not entail positive feedbacks in a bi directional manner: while the natural 
environment is beneficial for the economy (due to its health benefits), economic activity is   14 
detrimental for the environment. Given that Section 4 will provide significantly different 
results and implications, it is proper to summarise the existing result through  
 
Remark 1. When the emission rate  p  is fixed, the effect of pollution on life expectancy is not sufficient to 
generate multiple equilibria. Under any parameter configuration, the dynamics converge to a unique steady 
state equilibrium.  
 
     Prior to examining the economic implications of varying some structural parameters, we 
need to determine whether this equilibrium is stable. As it turns out, an additional restriction 
on the relative share of capital is sufficient to guarantee the stability of the equilibrium. 
Formally, this is established in  
 
Lemma 1. Suppose that 
1
2
β £ . Then the equilibrium pair  ˆ ˆ ( , ) k   , with  ˆ ˆ , 0 k   > ,  is locally stable.   
 
Proof. See the Appendix.   ■  
 
     Thus, as long as the share of capital on national income is not high enough, the steady 
state equilibrium is non trivial in the sense that the dynamics starting from any pair of initial 
values  0 0 ( 0, 0) k   > > ,  in  the  neighbourhood  of  ˆ ˆ ( , ) k   ,  will  converge  to  ˆ k k ¥ =   and 
ˆ     ¥ = . Notice that, although it may appear as a limiting scenario, the restriction 
1
2
β £  is 
supported by numerous empirical estimates who conclude that the relative share of capital 
income is significantly below 50% (e.g., Poterba, 1998; Gollin, 2002).  
     The equilibrium can be illustrated by means of the phase diagram in Figure 1. The PS 
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.  The  next  step  is  to  analyse  the  derivative, 
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 in the third term of the expression 









After substituting (17) and 
β
t t t Y y Bk = = , this expression becomes  1 2β -  which is non 
negative given that 
1
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 then it is certainly positive when using 
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J¢ = - < .  In  addition, 
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 while  t   ®¥  implies Ψ( ) 0 × =  and  0 t k = . 
The construction of the diagram is completed by observing that Κ 0
t   <  (see the Appendix) 
and  Μ 0
t k > . These imply that above (below) the CS schedule we have  1 t t k k + <  ( 1 t t k k + > ) 
and on the left (right) of the PS schedule we have  1 t t     + <  ( 1 t t     + > ).      
                                                 















 is obviously positive.   16 
 
Figure 1. The phase diagram 
 
3.1   Some Comparative Statics  
This part of the paper is devoted to the analysis of the equilibrium effects resulting from 
variations in the model’s structural parameters. These effects are summarised in  
 
Proposition 1. An economy with increased emissions and reduced natural absorption capacity will have 
lower income and higher pollution. More productive technologies and a stronger degree of competition are 
associated with higher income and higher pollution.  
 
Proof. See the Appendix.   ■    
 
     An  economy  that  employs  more  polluting  manufacturing  techniques  (i.e.,  higher  p )  
and/or possesses a limited absorption capacity (i.e., a higher rate of residual pollution η ) will 
experience a deterioration of environmental quality. This worsens the health profile of the 
population, leads to lower life expectancy and acts as an incentive to reduce saving. The 
process  of  capital  accumulation  is  impeded  and  causes  a  decline  in  production  and, 
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which is not strong enough, however, to counteract the increase in pollution resulting from 
the higher rate of emissions per unit manufactured goods. Eventually, the economy will 
settle down to a new long run equilibrium with lower income and higher pollution.  
     An improvement in the productivity of the manufacturing process (i.e., higher  B) will 
promote aggregate savings due to the rise in wages, while an improvement in the efficiency 
of the financial sector (i.e., higher q) will improve the process of capital formation for given 
amounts of saving . Both result in greater accumulation of capital which stimulates economic 
activity. The rise in aggregate production has two conflicting effects on the prospects of 
longevity. On the one hand, it has a direct benefit due to the rise in output. On the other 
hand, the stimulated activity implies that more pollutants are emitted in the environment. As 
it turns out, these two conflicting effects will cancel each other out and, eventually, the 
economy will settle to a new long run equilibrium with higher income and more pollution.    
     Finally, a higher degree of competition, captured by a higher elasticity of substitution σ , 
will stimulate saving and capital formation because it increases the share of output accruing 
to workers in the form of salaries. For a given emission rate, the accumulation of capital will 
stimulate production, thus leading to an increase in the stock of pollution.              
 
4  Threshold Effects and the Income-Pollution Nexus 
So far, the analysis has been based on the assumption that, in terms of its environmental 
impact, there is only one entrepreneurial technology that emits  p  units of pollution per unit 
of production. The purpose of this Section is to relax this assumption. Particularly, I shall 
assume that there are different technologies which can be distinguished according to their 
‘dirtiness’  – i.e.,  their  environmental  repercussions. Furthermore,  I  shall  treat  the  choice 
between these different technologies as being endogenous. Without loss of generality, the 
following analysis is focused in the symmetric equilibrium.  
     Suppose  that  entrepreneurs  have  a  choice  between  technologies  that  differ  purely  in 
terms of their emission indicator  t p . To simplify matters, let us assume that the choice is 
between two such technologies: the dirtier technology emits  t p p =  pollutants per unit of 
production  while  the  cleaner  technology  emits  t p p =   units  of  pollution  per  unit  of 
production. Naturally, I assume that  p p > . Entrepreneurs pay a ‘penalty’ (e.g., some type of   18 
environmental tax) which is related to the impact of their activities on environmental quality. 
Specifically, they pay a fraction  ( ) t γ p  of their profits. Following the analysis of Section 2.1, 
this assumption implies that an entrepreneur’s after tax variable profits (a fixed cost will be 
introduced shortly) are given by  [1 ( )]( ) t t t t γ p ρ m y - - . I assume that  ( ) 0 t γ p ¢ > , meaning 
that employing the more polluting technology results in a higher penalty.
12 Furthermore, I 
assume that the proceeds from taxation are used to finance public sector consumption,  t g , 
according to a balanced budget rule  ( ) t t t g γ p ̟ = .  
     Although  this  set up  renders  the  choice  of  a  cleaner  technology  to  be  economically 
appealing, such a choice is not straightforward as entrepreneurs will also incur a fixed cost 
for its implementation. To formalise the argument, assume that entrepreneurs face a cost 















,  (27) 
where  0 ε > .  
     Since  the  choice  of  technology  is  discrete,  it  can  be  separated  from  a  firm’s  other 
choices.
13 Hence, I am going to solve the entrepreneurs’ optimisation problem using two 
distinct steps. In the first step, they choose the amount of capital and labour they employ 
and the price of their product, for any technology described by  t p . In the second step, they 
choose the technology they will implement by comparing their utility (which corresponds to 
their after tax profitability) in each case, taking account of the results from the first step of 
the  optimisation  procedure.  In  the  symmetric  equilibrium,  and  given  our  preceding 
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12 As an example, we may think of the Republic of Ireland’s Vehicle Registration Tax (VRT) whose rates are 
lower for cars that emit less carbon dioxides per kilometre.   
13 See the recent paper by Chen et al. (2009) for a similar application of this concept.     19 
     Given  1 t L =   and  t t K k =   by  combining  (12)  and  (28)  we  can  conclude  that  the 
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where  
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.  (30) 
     The emergence of an endogenous threshold in the process of economic development 
could be a potential source for some very important implications. Above all, it is related to 
the  possibility  of  multiple,  non trivial  steady state  equilibria  which  imply  that  long run 
outcomes  concerning  prosperity,  environmental  conditions  and  longevity  are  path 
dependent. We can begin formalising these issues by observing that the preceding results, 
combined with the dynamics of the pollution stock in (24), imply that the PS locus will now 











  for  which  the  expressions  in  (29)  and  (30)  indicate  that 
lim ( ) lim ( )
t t
t t
k k k k
G k G k
- + ® ®
>
ɶ ɶ . These observations generate the result that I demonstrate in 
 
Lemma 2. Suppose that  lim ( ) ( ) lim ( )
t t
t t
k k k k
G k J k G k
- + ® ®
> >
ɶ ɶ
ɶ  . Then, there exist two pairs of locally stable 
steady state equilibria, 
1 1 ˆ ˆ ( , ) k    and 
2 2 ˆ ˆ ( , ) k   , such that 
2 1 ˆ ˆ k k k > > ɶ  and 
2 1 ˆ ˆ     < . 
 
Proof.  Let  us  begin  with  the  values  for  capital  intensity  that  satisfy  t k k < ɶ.  Given 








ɶ ,0 (0) (0) G J = < ®¥,   ( ) 0 G¢ × >  and  ( ) 0 J¢ × < , a steady state equilibrium 
1 1 ˆ ˆ ( , ) k    with 
1 ˆ k k < ɶ exists. Analogously, for values of capital intensity that satisfy  t k k ³ ɶ we 
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,    ( ) 0 G¢ × >   and   20 
( ) 0 J¢ × < .  Therefore,  a  steady state  equilibrium 
2 2 ˆ ˆ ( , ) k     with 
2 ˆ k k > ɶ  exists.  Of  course, 
( ) 0 J¢ × <   and 
2 1 ˆ ˆ k k >   imply  that 
2 1 2 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) J k J k     < ⇒ < .  Analytically,  these  pairs  of 
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.  
 
By appealing to Proposition 1, we can readily verify that 
2 1 ˆ ˆ k k >  and 
2 1 ˆ ˆ     < , while the local 
stability of these equilibria can be inferred from Lemma 1.   ■       
 
     At this point, we can make a direct comparison with the results of the baseline model, as 
this was presented in Section 3. This is done through  
 
Remark 2. A varying and endogenously determined emission rate  t p  is necessary for the effect of pollution 
on life expectancy to generate multiple equilibria. Depending on initial capital endowments, the dynamics may 
converge to different pairs of steady state equilibria.  
 
     In Figure 2, I illustrate the scenario which is formally derived in Lemma 2. Given that all 
other parameters determining the CS schedule are unchanged, the increase in equilibrium 
income  necessitates  an  improvement  in  survival  prospects  brought  forward  by 
improvements in environmental quality. The drop in the emission rate is indeed sufficient 
enough to guarantee that pollutant emissions are lower, even though production is higher for   21 
2 1 ˆ ˆ k k > .  If  parameter  values  satisfy 
1 2 ˆ ˆ k k k < < ɶ   then  the  determination  of  the  long run 
equilibrium is path dependent: the economy’s history, in terms of capital endowment, will 
determine its stationary, long run equilibrium. We can summarise these implications through 
 
Proposition 2. As long as multiple equilibria exist, the economy achieving the high income equilibrium 
will enjoy better environmental quality and higher longevity in comparison to the economy achieving the low 
income equilibrium. 
 
Proof. It follows from Lemma 2 and the properties of the survival probability function, given 
in (18).   ■  
    
     One of the irrefutable facts of the economic development experience is that the world’s 
per  capita  income  distribution  appears  to  be  polarised  between  low   and  high income 
countries – an observation that has been labelled as ‘club convergence’ (e.g., Quah, 1997; 
Canova,  2004).  Another  persistent  feature  in  the  data  is  the  strong,  positive  correlation 
between per capita GDP and life expectancy (e.g., Fogel, 1994; Jamison et al., 2005). The 
emergence  of  multiple  equilibria  in  this  framework  can  account  for  these  facts  and,  in 
addition, it illustrates another important point: although environmental decay is a by product 
of economic activity, when multiple equilibria exist it is actually the more developed country 
that enjoys improved environmental quality and, therefore, higher life expectancy. 
 
4.1   Mechanism and Intuition  
This  paper  seeks  to  provide  a  novel  mechanism  leading  to  the  emergence  of  multiple 
equilibria in the joint determination of capital accumulation, life expectancy and pollution. In 
the  existing  literature,  this  result  has  been  attributed  to  the  complementary  nature  of 
economic  activity  and  environmental  quality:  the  latter  improves  the  former  through 
improved life expectancy, while the former improves the latter because additively separable 
environmental  effects  allow  pollution  abatement  to  be  more  pronounced  than  actual 
pollution (see Mariani et al., 2010).  
     The intuition and the mechanisms involved in my paper are quite different. In addition to 
the positive impact of reduced pollution for health and economic activity – exemplified by   22 
the  negative  slope  of  the  CS  schedule  –  another  crucial  aspect  of  my  analysis  is  that 
economic activity may, to some extent, also facilitate environmental improvements because 
it provides the incentive to entrepreneurs for implementing cleaner production methods in 
response to environmental policy.  
     Effectively, what my framework shows is that the costs of pollution in terms of increased 
mortality are not sufficient to guarantee multiple equilibria when, for a given emission rate, 
output growth entails net environmental costs. For path dependent equilibria to emerge in 
this framework, a crucial aspect is the endogeneity of the emission rate – in particular, the 
way  that  the  emission to output  ratio  is  optimally  chosen  in  response  to  environmental 
taxation (see Remarks 1 and 2).  The intuition for this mechanism can be clarified as follows. 
Environmental taxation induces entrepreneurs to incur the (fixed) cost of implementing a 
cleaner  technology  (i.e.,  one  with  a  lower  emission  rate).  Nevertheless,  this  incentive 
materialises only when the economy’s capital stock exceeds some (endogenously derived) 
threshold.  When  this  happens,  the  implementation  of  cleaner  production  techniques 
ameliorates the quality of the environment and, consequently, improves life expectancy. The 
latter effect supports saving, capital accumulation and economic growth. Thus, the economy 
retains  the  economic  resources  that  are  necessary  in  rendering  the  choice  of  cleaner 
technologies optimal.         
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5   Conclusion 
In this paper, I have constructed a model in which the dynamics of pollution and capital 
accumulation interact and are, therefore, jointly determined. Although capital accumulation 
is responsible for the built up of more pollutants, the latter reduce capital formation due to 
their  detrimental  effect  on  life  expectancy  and,  therefore,  saving  behaviour.  While  the 
baseline setting results in a unique stationary equilibrium, I have shown that the introduction 
of environmental taxation and endogenous technology choice (the different technologies 
classified according to their emission rate) can lead to the emergence of multiple equilibria. 
When this happens, the lower stock of pollution is associated with a higher capital stock and 
higher  longevity.  The  mechanism  that  is  emphasised  in  my  paper  comes  through  the 
interactions of environmental taxation and technology choice (in terms of the emission rate) 
and how these, together with endogenous longevity, can impinge on the joint dynamics of 
pollution and capital accumulation.  
     Admittedly,  when  it  comes  to  the  trade off  between  generality  and  clarity  of  the 
mechanisms involved, I have opted for the latter. I believe that there is enough justification 
for this approach. First of all, the driving forces behind the main results, as well as their 
intuition, are so transparent that it is perhaps unlikely that more general functional forms or 
an expanded set  of  available  entrepreneurial  technologies  would  do anything other  than 
blurring the clarity of intuition. Secondly, the decision to abscond from the discussion of 
some  other  important  issues  on  the  pollution economic  growth  nexus,  such  as  the 
environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), should not be mistakenly viewed as a conscious effort 
to demote their importance. On the contrary, it was the understanding that the importance 
(as well as the highly contested nature) of issues such as the EKC hypothesis probably merit 
an analysis of their own. 
     In order to make my argument more transparent, let me return to the simplest version of 
the model, as this is presented in Section 3 and illustrated in Figure 1. Obviously, the (stable) 
equilibrium  represented  diagrammatically  in  Figure  1  can  allow  us  to  choose  different 
combinations for the initial stocks of pollution and physical capital and examine when the 
resulting transitional dynamics are in accordance with the EKC and when they are not. I 
believe that such a discussion would move the attention away from the particular issue of 
interest in my analysis – the issue of threshold effects on the joint determination of capital   24 
accumulation, environmental quality and life expectancy. What is more, it would not do 
justice  to  an  important  topic  whose  proper  analysis  and  discussion  requires  a  distinct 
consideration and discussion of its own. Perhaps, the current framework can provide the 
basis for such analysis, as part of future research work.        
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Proof of Lemma 1 
The Jacobian matrix associated with the dynamical system of (23) and (24) is  
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t t t t k     k D k   k   k   k   = -  respectively. It is well known that the stability 
of the equilibrium is established when the conditions (1 )(1 ) 0 D T D T + - + + >  and  1 D <  
hold simultaneously. 
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Substituting (25) and (26) in (A1) yields 
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¢   × - ×   = + ⇒     + × + ×      
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Ψ ( ) 1 ˆ ˆ Κ ( , ) 1
Ψ( )[1 Ψ( )]
t k
η
k   β
p
 ¢  × -
= +  
× + ×  
.  (A2) 











.  (A3) 
In the steady state we have 









 therefore (A3) becomes  2β . Of 
course,  2 1 β £  given that  1/2 β £  by assumption. Since 





¢ >  also holds then 
ˆ ˆ 1 Ψ ( ) Ψ ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ Ψ( ) Ψ( )[1 Ψ( )]
x x




. Consequently, if (A3) cannot take a value above unity then, 
from (A2), it is certainly  ˆ ˆ 0 Κ ( , ) 1
t k k   < < . 
     Using  equation  (24)  we  get  ˆ ˆ Μ ( , ) (0,1)
t   k   η = Î   which  implies  that 
ˆ ˆ Κ ( , ) 0
t k T η k   = + > . Furthermore, we can use (23) and (24) to derive  
 
1 ˆ ˆ ˆ Μ ( , ) 0
t
β
k k   pβBk




ˆ Ψ ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ Κ ( , ) Θ 0






k   q k
 
  ¢ ×
= - <  
+ ×  
.  (A5) 
Thus,  (A4)  and  (A5),  combined  with  previous  results,  imply  that 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ Κ ( , ) Κ ( , )Μ ( , ) 0
t t t k   k D η k   k   k   = - >  and 1 0 D T + + > . Additionally, we can derive  
  ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 Κ ( , ) Κ ( , )Μ ( , ) Κ ( , ) 1
t t t t k   k k D T η k   k   k   η k   - + = - - - + ⇒ 
  ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 1 (1 )Κ ( , ) Κ ( , )Μ ( , )
t t t k   k D T η η k   k   k   - + = - - - - ⇒ 
  ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 (1 )[1 Κ ( , )] Κ ( , )Μ ( , )
t t t k   k D T η k   k   k   - + = - - - . 
Given  (A4),  (A5)  and  ˆ ˆ 0 Κ ( , ) 1
t k k   < < ,  we  have  1 0 D T - + >   which  means  that 
( 1)( 1) 0 D T D T + + - + > .  Consequently,  since  0 D > ,  we  need  to  show  that  1 D <   in 
order to establish the stability of the equilibrium.  
     Substitution of (26) in (A5) yields    29 
 
2
2 2 2 2




















¢ - - ×
=
+ ×
.  (A6) 
















-   ×
= ⇒   + ×  
 
 









.  (A7) 




Θ(1 ) Ψ ( ) 1 Ψ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ Κ ( , )Μ ( , )
[1 Ψ( )] Θ Ψ( )
t t   k
q η pβB
k   k  
p B q





2 (1 ) Ψ ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ Κ ( , )Μ ( , )
Ψ( )[1 Ψ( )]
t t   k
β η
k   k  
p
¢ - - ×
=
× + ×
.  (A8) 
Next, we can combine (A2) and (A8) to derive the determinant  
  ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ Κ ( , ) Κ ( , )Μ ( , )
t t t k   k D η k   k   k   = - ⇒ 
 
2 Ψ ( ) 1 (1 ) Ψ ( )




¢ ¢ × - - ×
= + + ⇒
× + × × + ×
 
 
Ψ ( ) 1
[ (1 )]
Ψ( )[1 Ψ( )]
η
D β η η η
p
 ¢  × -
= + + - ⇒  
× + ×  
 
 
Ψ ( ) 1




 ¢  × -
= +  
× + ×  
.  (A9) 










.  (A10) 





= .  Substituting  in  (A10)  yields  (1 ) 1 β η + <   because 
1/2 β £  and 0 1 η < < . However, it is 
ˆ ˆ 1 Ψ ( ) Ψ ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ Ψ( ) Ψ( )[1 Ψ( )]
x x










¢ >  
holds  by  assumption.  This  implies  that,  if  (A10)  is  below  1,  then,  given  (A9),  we  can   30 
conclude that  1 D <  as well. Hence, we have proven that the equilibrium  ˆ ˆ , 0 k   >  is locally 
stable.   ■  
 
Proof of Proposition 1 






ˆ 1 ΘΨ( ) ΘΨ ( ) 1
0




-   ¢   ¶ × × -







ˆ 1 ΘΨ( ) ΘΨ ( ) 1
0




-   ¢   ¶ × ×







ˆ 1 ΘΨ( ) (1 )Ψ( ) 1
0
1 1 Ψ( ) 1 Ψ( )
β k q β
σ β σ
-
-     ¶ × - ×




-   ¶ - - ×
= >   ¶ - + ×  
1
1 1 1
1 ˆ 1 1 (1 )Ψ( )
0
1 1 Ψ( )
β









1 ˆ 1 1 (1 )Ψ( )
0
1 1 Ψ( )
β




-   ¶ - - ×
= >   ¶ - + ×  
. 
From (26) we have  
 
1
1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0
1 1 1
β β
β β   p pB β k
k k
B η η β B
-
- - ¶ ¶
= + >




1 ˆ ˆ ˆ 0
1 1
β
β   pB β k
k








1 ˆ ˆ ˆ 0
1 1
β
β   pB β k
k




¶ - - ¶







1 1 Ψ( ) 1
ΘΨ( ) ΘΨ ( ) 1
         ,












  ¶ ×
= + ´   ¶ - + × -  
  ¢   × × -
-     - + × + ×    









(1 ) 1 Ψ( ) 1
ΘΨ( ) ΘΨ ( ) 1
        












  ¶ ×
= + ´   ¶ - + × -  
  ¢   × ×
-     - + × + ×    
  (A12) 
After some manipulation, equations (A11) and (A12) can be written as  
 
1 ˆ ΘΨ( ) 1 Ψ ( )
1
1 1 Ψ( ) 1 Ψ( )[1 Ψ( )]
β
β   B β η
p η β p
-    ¢  ¶ × - ×
= -     ¶ - + × - × + ×    





ˆ ΘΨ( ) 1 Ψ ( )
1
(1 ) 1 Ψ( ) 1 Ψ( )[1 Ψ( )]
β
β   Bp β η
η η β p
-    ¢  ¶ × - ×
= -     ¶ - + × - × + ×    
,  (A14) 



















 because  1/2 β £  holds. However, we know that 
ˆ ˆ 1 Ψ ( ) Ψ ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ Ψ( ) Ψ( )[1 Ψ( )]
x x






















.   ■ 
 
 